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THE
QUESTION
STATED

With regard to

Our Army in FLANDERS.

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STATED
With regard to
Our Army in Flanders.



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John Lord Hervey

THE
QUESTION

ENGLAND. [Appendix. — History and Politics. — II. 1743.]
STATED K

With regard to

Our Army in FLANDERS:

AND

The ARGUMENTS *for* and *against*
this Measure compared.

Esurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimisit inanes.
DAVID,

Ac si liceret vera narraturi atrociora vulgaverant.
TA. Hist. Lib. 3.

The SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for J. ROBERTS, near the Oxford-
Arms in Warwick-Lane. MDCCXLIII.

THE
QUESTION
STANDARD



With regard to

Our Army in Flanders

AND

The Arguments for and against
this Measure compared

Historical importance of the British Army
in Flanders, 1794-1815
The British Army in Flanders, 1794-1815
The British Army in Flanders, 1794-1815

THE SECOND EDITION

LONDON:

Printed by J. Roberts, near the Oxford
Street, in the Strand, London.

The Question stated, &c.

OUR collective Army in *Flanders* being at present the principal Object of most Peoples Attention, the Employment of most Polemical Pens, and the Topic of most political Conversations; it cannot be thought unseasonable, and may prove not unbeneficial, to endeavour to exhibit to the Publick, connected in one View, the principal Objections to this seemingly rash, probably dangerous, certainly expensive, and hitherto unintelligible Measure; together with the Motives and Inducements avow'd by the present Administration, for taking this Step; as well as those conjectured Reasons they may have had of a less ostensible Nature, which have been given for them, and which they

neither think fit to confess, nor succeed in denying.

And in enumerating the Objections to this Measure, I think it will not be difficult to show, that it is a Measure (as far as the World is yet inform'd) apparently contrary to all general *Maxims* of Policy :

Contrary to the particular *Maxims* of Policy that ought almost universally to operate in the Councils of this Country :

Contrary to the *Sense* of the People :

And contrary to the *Sense* of Parliament.

It is certainly contrary to general *Maxims* of Policy for any Nation to enter into a War, without some advantageous End proposed, without a Probability of that End being attainable, and if attainable, worthy the Hazards that are to be run, and the Expences that must be incurred to come at it. And that no advantageous End to this
Nation

Nation is propos'd by this Measure; that the End said to be propos'd, of the Restoration of the House of *Austria* to its former Weight in *Europe* is not attainable; and if it were attainable, that the Dangers and Expences attending the Attempt are more than it could be worth to this Country, will I think fully appear in the Sequel of what I have to offer in these Papers; and moreover, that if this Endeavour to make the House of *Austria* rise like a *Phoenix* out of its own Ashes were an advantageous End; and that it were attainable, and that it was worth the Dangers and Expences we incur in going about it, that we have not gone about it in a manner that can do the House of *Austria* any good, by assembling an Army in *Flanders*.

It is equally repugnant to all general *Maxims* of Policy, for a Nation already engaged in one War, officiously to draw itself into another; especially when that Nation finds itself hardly

hardly able to support the Expences of that War in which it is already engaged, and equally incapable of pursuing or concluding it with Advantage. Nor is it possible to deny the Impropriety of a Power, barely justifiable in acting as an Auxiliary in a War, taking such Steps as may soon make that Power become the Principal. Our sending an Army into *Flanders* in our present Circumstances is a Measure too obviously contradictory to all these *Maxims* of general Policy which I have quoted, for me to think it necessary to show how it jars severally with every one of them.

As to the particular *Maxims* of Policy that ought to operate in the Councils of this Country; the Employment of our maritime Force, and the declining all Land Wars, are Truths so universally allow'd, that unless our Ministers could show that the commencing or inviting a War in *Flanders* was absolutely necessary, it is impossible

fible for them to justify this Measure :
 And as the only Necessity that can be
 pleaded for any War, is its being Self-
 defence, or what a Nation is bound to
 in Honour by Treaties ; and that these
 hostile Preparations come under nei-
 ther of those Heads, it is as impossible
 for the Administration, to plead the
 Necessity of this Step, as it is in my
 Opinion, for them to justify the Ex-
 pediency, or show the Utility of it.
 The Expediency they pretend, is the
 Support of the House of *Austria*, and
 the humbling of *France*. And though
 these may seem very plausible Reasons,
 from the Popularity of such Expres-
 sions, yet when they come to be ap-
 plied to the present Case they will be
 found to be nothing but meer Pre-
 tences, vain Words, and empty Sounds.
 For with regard to the Support of the
 House of *Austria*, if they mean by
 Support, the restoring it to the Power
 and Strength of which it was possess'd
 even in the late Reign of *Charles* the
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With, it is absolutely impracticable ; the *Austrian* Succession being already dismember'd, even with our Consent, of the Province of *Silesia* ; and to repair that Strength of course *Silesia* must be restored, or an Equivalent must be design'd elsewhere. The first of these nobody can imagine is propos'd ; and the last, notwithstanding some very strong, tho' yet unauthenticated Reports, I hope was never promised ; since that must turn the present defensive War of the Queen of *Hungary* into an offensive War, and a War of Acquisition instead of a War of Resistance. A War very imprudent for her to undertake, equally imprudent for us to assist her in, more so for us to have instigated, and what we are neither bound to by Treaty, induced to by Interest, or equal to in Strength, and consequently what we are neither oblig'd, nor fit to engage in from any Consideration whatever.

The

The House of *Austria* being now divested of the Imperial Dignity, and of course of all the Pretence, if not the Right that an Emperor has to call on the Princes of the Empire to support him in any Quarrel, is another Abatement of its Strength; which makes it as impossible for us to put the House of *Austria* again upon the same Foot it has been of being a Match for *France*, as it would be to endeavour to procure the Resurrection of such a Power in the House of *Austria*, as *Charles* the Vth maintain'd, when he was engag'd with *Francis* the Ist, and possess'd not only of the Imperial Dignity and Strength of the Empire, but of the greatest Part of *Italy*, the Throne of *Spain*, and the Treasures of the *West-Indies*. Nor is the House of *Austria* now only divested of the Strength arising from the Possession of the Imperial Throne, but by being engaged in a War with the Emperor, finds the Weight of that Circumstance

not only taken out of its own Scale, but thrown into that of its Antagonist.

To aim therefore at restoring the House of *Austria* in the general and extensive Sense in which we so often now hear those Words sonorously used, and absurdly applied, and to labour the Point of restoring the Queen of *Hungary's* emaciated Strength to that of her Ancestors, would be like trying to put the Doctrine of the Transfusion of Blood into Practice, by which we might drain the miserable Veins of this Country, without giving that Force to her of which we should divest ourselves. And yet in the Pursuit of this chimerical Project our Ministers think fit not only to open the Purse of this Country, but to drain it; not only to impair our Strength, but to exhaust it; and not only to expose this Country, but to sacrifice it.

But for Argument sake, let us take it for granted, that this Measure is design'd to support the Queen of *Hungary*,

ry, and then let us see how far it will answer that End. She is not attack'd in *Flanders*, consequently apprehends no Loss there; we cannot then propose her Defence in that Country; she has no Claim there, proposes no Acquisition there, consequently wants no Assistance there. She is attack'd in *Germany*, has suffer'd Losses which she wants to regain, and there we give her no Assistance; so that where she wants Aid, we give her none, and under the Pretence of Aid, send our Forces where they are quite useless to her.

In the Light of humbling *France*, this Measure appears to me just as absurd as in the other: For what was the State of *France* when we sent these Troops into *Flanders*? She had many Armies in *Germany* harassing those of the Queen of *Hungary*, harass'd themselves by long, frequent and inconvenient Marches; in a Country where they were hated, and Accommodations hard to be got if they had been loved;

loved: Recruits difficult to be sent
 from their being so remote from home;
 and their Distress such, (as it was given
 out at least by our Ministers) that the
 Loss of all the *French* Armies in *Ger-*
many was an Event not improbable.
 And in this Situation, what was the
 Step our Ministers thought fit to take
 in order to distress *France*? Why, not
 to send Troops against her to increase
 her Distress where she was already di-
 stress'd, and where the Scale between
 her and her Adversary seem'd so
 equally pois'd, by balancing alternately
 from Side to Side, that our Weight
 might have turn'd it: Not to follow
 her into a Country where she must
 fight under all these Disadvantages,
 and where if she made Conquests she
 conquer'd only for others; but to en-
 deavour to draw the War into a Place,
 where from being nearer Home she
 will engage her Enemies with infinite-
 ly greater Advantage, where of course
 she will be more likely to make Con-
 quests,

quests, and where if she does make Conquests, she will likewise make Acquisitions, add Territories to Victories, and Dominion to Laurels; and into a Place, which tho' *France* wishes shou'd be the Seat of War, yet where, unless we had given her this Pretence for drawing her Troops that Way, she never, for fear of alarming *Holland*, could, would, or dar'd to have appear'd.

This Step therefore may be a Means to save *France* from the Losses she might sustain in *Germany*, or to reimburse her for them in *Flanders*: It may in the End turn to the aggrandizing of *France*, but how it can humble or weaken her is past my Comprehension.

It was certainly this way of reasoning, that made *Holland* not only refuse to join with us in this Measure, but publickly to disavow it. And tho' *Holland* may be glad enough to see her Rival in Trade neglect what ought
to

to be our Business, to be expensively dabbling in what is none of our Business, and metamorphosing a mercantile Nation into a military one; yet no doubt she wishes we had engross'd the Danger, as well as the Charge, and not blunder'd upon the only Wall against which she had not as lief see us break our silly Heads as not.

This Measure then of assembling an Army in *Flanders* is, I think, manifestly as inexpedient as it is unnecessary, as I can see no good End propos'd, no good End attainable; and if there were any good End attainable, no Alliance to support it, no Riches to defray the Charge of it, and no Means to pursue it. Nor is it only a Measure that can be productive of no Detriment to the Adversary, nor Utility to our Ally the Queen of *Hungary*; but what is worst of all, must be, and is an Offence to the *Dutch*, as it invites a War where they are most apprehensive of it, and from whence they wou'd be

be most glad to avert it; which of course makes all our wise Operations least palatable to a Power, whom we ought to use our utmost Endeavours to co-operate with us; as well as most advantageous to that Power, whom we pretend to design distressing; and which, if we must always be meddling on the Continent, it ought certainly ever to be our View to annoy and weaken.

If therefore the other Powers of *Europe* have Reason to apprehend the Power of *France*, and that her increasing her Power in *Flanders* is what they must dread most, and *France* desire most, *Europe* has just the same Obligation to *England* for endeavouring to make *Flanders* the Seat of War, that a Patient would have to a Physician, who should endeavour to draw the Gout out of his Limbs into his Stomach, and to divert that Humour from those remote Parts where it might waste itself by degrees, in order to

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bring it into a Part where it might prove immediately mortal.

Having said thus much with regard to the little Necessity, Expediency or Utility of this Measure, I shall now consider it as contrary to the *Sense* of the Nation, and to the *Sense* of Parliament.

With regard to this Measure being contrary to the *Sense* of the Nation: Every body remembers that the principal Objection to our entering into the *Spanish War* was, that sooner or later *France* would certainly be induced to assist *Spain*, which all Sides agreed was a Danger much to be feared, but a Risk which the Contenders for that War thought we ought to run, rather than suffer longer the Insults offer'd by *Spain* to the Honour of this Nation, and the Prejudice we suffer'd in our Trade in the *West-Indies*; and yet we are now trying by this Measure to make it not only more certain for *France* to be against us, as an auxiliary

ry to *Spain* in a Maritime War, but forcing her to be a Principal against us in a Land War; lavishly, wantonly, and fruitlessly doubling and trebling by these Means all our Expences, without hurting a Foe, or obliging a Friend; putting *France* into a Situation, where only she could benefit herself; and *England* into one, where no Benefit can arise; forsaking an Enemy we might hurt, to provoke one we can't; and judiciously neglecting a necessary War, in which we are already engaged, and might be Gainers, to enter into an unnecessary War, in which we are sure to be Losers; and in a Place, where if Gain is made, it can only be the Gain of *France*.

The only Use the Queen of *Hungary* can possibly make of this Army, is one we should least desire she shou'd make; which is taking this Opportunity to make a separate Peace; as she may naturally imagine *France* at this time will be more ready to come into an Accommodation, and upon

more reasonable Terms than have hitherto been offer'd, for these two Reasons: In the first Place, for the sake of changing the Seat of War so advantageously for herself; and in the next, for the sake of being at liberty to resent this Affront put upon her, by *England*; an Affront so convenient to her, that without the prudent Conduct of our present Ministers in sending these Forces into *Flanders*, which will give *France* the Pretence of Self-defence for drawing hers thither, she could never, as I have just observ'd, consistently with her Declarations to *Holland*, or her Policy in desiring to keep *Holland* neuter, have come near the *Low-Countries* at all, or had the least Shadow of Excuse for doing what she most desires.

And whenever this separate Peace between *France* and the Queen of *Hungary* shall happen, (and sooner or later I fear it will happen) what will be the agreeable Situation of this Country? We shall see *France* disengaged
by

by us from all other Enemies, and falling upon us as her sole Enemy; whilst at the same time *England* will not only have the War with *Spain* (alone as much as she can bear) still upon her Hands, but the additional Weight of all the Resentment and Power of *France*; *France* without any other Foe, *England* with another, and without an Ally: When we may too reasonably and pathetically, and perhaps vainly say, *Give Peace in our Time, O Lord; for there is none other that fighteth for us, but only thou, O God.*

As these Consequences must be apprehended by every sensible Man in this Country, this Reason alone, without the others I have given, and that I shall give relating to *Holland* under the following Head, would be sufficient to demonstrate, that this Measure of commencing or inviting a War with *France* by collecting an Army in *Flanders*, must be contrary to the Sense of the Nation, as it is so manifestly
contra-

contradictory to the Rules of common Sense.

I shall now show how far this Measure is contrary not only to the presumed, but even to the declared *Sense* of Parliament. The Address of the *House of Commons* last Year, on which the Vote of Credit for 500,000*l.* was founded, has these Words in it; *As the late favourable Turn of Affairs affords reasonable Grounds to hope, that if she (the Queen of Hungary) is timely and properly assisted by those Powers who are engaged by Treaties, and bound by Interest to support her, the Balance of Power may be again restored, and the Tranquility of Europe re-established: This House will therefore proceed with Unanimity, Vigor, and Dispatch to support his Majesty in all such Measures as shall be necessary to attain these great and desirable Ends.* Now I would be glad to know what Interpretation ought to be put, or can be put upon the foregoing Part of the Words I have quoted, but that the *House of Com-*
mons

mons does make it a Condition that other Powers, who are engag'd by Treaty, and bound in Interest to support the Queen of *Hungary*, should join with us in any thing we undertake for her Service, or at least in this Expedition. And what other Powers can be here meant but the *States General*? Whatever Powers are meant, the Condition is not complied with, since there is not a Power in *Europe* who has guaranteed the *Pragmatic Sanction*, besides ourselves, who does now act for the Queen of *Hungary*. The King in his Speech at the Close of the last Session, speaks of the then favourable *Disposition of the States General*; by which one should have imagin'd, that those who advised the Crown, had interpreted the Address of the *House of Commons* in the same manner it was interpreted by every other Man in *England*.

But this favourite Measure of collecting an Army in *Flanders* being to be pursued at all Hazards, and notwithstanding

withstanding all Obstacles, the King was advis'd oraculously to utter these doubtful Words from the Throne, at the Close of the last Session, whilst more explicit in Action, Preparations were making to put this prudent, frugal Scheme in Execution, whether *Holland* or any other Power join'd with us or not.

I have not perhaps a higher Opinion of the Sagacity and Penetration of our present Ministers than most other People entertain, and yet I cannot believe them so very blind and ignorant, as not to perceive and know by every thing that was said or done in Parliament last Winter, that no Troops were design'd by the Parliament to be sent over to *Flanders* without some Junction of *Dutch* Forces; and yet these Troops were sent over, not only without this Junction, but without the Consent of the *Dutch*; not only without their Consent, but even, as they publickly declared, without their Know-

Knowledge; and when they did know it, without their Approbation.

If the Administration had any Doubts about the *Sense* of Parliament upon this Point, why did they not come to Parliament for an Explanation of it? They could have no other Reason than their being resolved, as I have before said, at all hazards, to pursue this Measure, and chusing rather to plead Ignorance of what the Parliament design'd, than to act diametrically opposite to what the Parliament wou'd have advis'd, if the Advice of the Parliament had been ask'd.

Holland and *England* are such natural Allies, that as they share in Peace the Profits of Trade, they ought also to share in War the Burdens of those Expences; but by this wise Measure we have kindly loaded ourselves with their Share of the Burden, and generously given *Holland* in lieu of it our Share of the Profit, by taking upon ourselves the whole Expence, and Hazard of War, whilst we leave them the

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sole Possession of the Advantages arising from Peace.

It has been said in Excuse for the present Administration, that these Troops were assembled as an Experiment to invite *Holland* to come in: But here again I must compliment the Understandings of the Ministers so far at the Expence of their Sincerity, as to say it was impossible this could be their Reason; since they could not be so very injudicious in this Case, as not previously to have ask'd the *States General* this plain Question, If we do assemble an Army in *Flanders* will you join us, Ay or No? If *Holland* had answered in the Negative, the Measure would not have been executed: If in the Affirmative, the Administration would have been justified, whether *Holland* had kept her Word or not.

It has been pleaded to in Justification of this Measure, and urg'd as a Proof that the Parliament did design the *Engliss* Forces to be sent over into *Flanders*,

Flanders, that the Parliament not only provided for the Expences of the Staff, &c. but voted 4000 additional Men upon that Supposition for the Defence of this Country. But this does not at all prove that the Parliament ever imagin'd this Step would or should have been taken without the Consent, Approbation, and Junction of *Holland*. The Ministers therefore, in order to justify their subsequent Steps, found themselves obliged to affect supposing, what no other Man in *England* did suppose, which was, that the Parliament design'd this Step should be taken, whether the *Dutch* join'd with us or not. For if they had not affected to take this for granted, they would have had no Plea for taking the 16000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay, which they now say was absolutely necessary, because 16000 *English*, with the *Hessians* and *Austrians*, would not have made a Body of Forces sufficient for any Purpose without other Troops being added. But by this Chain of

reasoning, they first assert for a Truth, what no body but themselves believed, or pretended to believe, and then draw a Consequence from that absurd Postulatum, which is as little to be defended ; since the saying these Troops would have serv'd no Purpose without the Augmentation of the 16000 *Hanoverians*, is saying nothing in Defence of that Augmentation, unless the Ministers at the same time could show that these Troops did serve any Purpose (except the paying them) after that Augmentation was made. And what other Purpose this Augmentation served, I believe would puzzle the most ingenious Sophists, and the most fertile Invention in all our Administration even to suggest, and much more to make appear.

Besides, if the Sense of the Parliament, and the Sense of all Mankind, had not been grossly, and so grossly that People may be apt to suspect it was wilfully mistaken by the Ministers, the want of these additional *Hanoverians*

rians in *Flanders* could never have been pleaded: For if *Holland* had join'd with us in this Measure, which I must for ever repeat, all the World took for a fundamental Condition, and the Basis of the whole; the 16000 *English*, and 16000 *Austrians* which the Queen of *Hungary* ought to have furnished, together with the 12000 *Dutch* Forces, and the 6000 *Hessians* in our Pay, would have form'd an Army of 50000 Men; a sufficient Body of Troops to have executed any Scheme, if the Ministers had been lucky enough to have chopt upon any proper to have been executed. But as that was not their Case, and that the *Use* and *Destination* of these Forces was a Matter left to be considered after they were assembled; I presume this might be another Reason, and Reason of itself sufficient, for the *States-General* desiring to be excused, when they were called upon to unite with us in this Measure. And as the Union of *Holland* would have made the March of the *Hanove-*
rians,

rians, and consequently our paying them, yet more unnecessary, if possible, than they seem at present; so the real Affliction of our Ministers upon the Refusal of *Holland* was not perhaps quite so acute as it was pretended to be, nor their Disappointment equal to their Complaints.

The King's being advised, at the opening of the present Session, to tell the Parliament, that the March of the *Hanoverian* Troops was a Measure he foresaw would be necessary before the Close of the last Session, was certainly a Slip in the Ministers, as it exposed them to greater Difficulties than any it drew them out of: For tho' the Ministers cavalierly intimated by this, that the Parliament ought not to be surpriz'd at this extraordinary Step; yet it show'd at the same time, that tho' the King might have ask'd their Advice upon it, before the Separation of the Parliament, he chose rather to proceed, on this Occasion, by an Exertion of his Prerogative without their Advice:

Advice: A Choice, which no body, I believe, imagines any Minister would have advis'd the Crown to make, if he had not been conscious, that the Parliament would never have consented to it; and that the Court would then have been reduced to the ugly Dilemma of relinquishing this favorite Measure, or pursuing it contrary to the declared Sense of Parliament, as well as contrary to what was as well known, as if it had been declared.

But besides the original Solecism we were guilty of in Politicks from general Principles and Maxims, by having any Army in *Flanders* without the Junction of *Dutch* Troops, our chusing to supply the want of the *Dutch* Forces by these *Hanoverian* Mercenaries, or by any Troops hir'd of a Prince of the Empire, doubled the Absurdity of our Proceeding, as it both diminish'd the Utility of this Army, and increas'd the Expence of it. For had this Army been made up of *English*, *Austrians* and *Dutch*, it might have acted

acted not only where it is most wanted, but where alone it ought to act, which is in *Germany*; whereas, as the Case now stands, it is under an insuperable Obstacle of acting at all: Since every body knows, notwithstanding the sophistical Arguments which have been thrown out in order to blind Mankind, and puzzle this Truth, That the Troops of no Prince of the Empire dare or will act against the Emperor, for fear of subjecting that Prince to whom they belong, to the Fulminations of the Imperial Power, and the Ban of the Empire.

It is an express Stipulation in the *Eighth Article of the Treaty of Westphalia*; a Treaty not made when the Emperor was strong, and the Princes of the Empire weak, but a Treaty in Favour of the Rights of the latter; That no Prince of the Empire shall bear Arms against the Emperor, any more than against the Empire. And what the present Emperor so sorely proved in the late War, during the
Reign

Reign of the Emperor *Joseph*, for transgressing this Article, by being put under the Ban of the Empire, and having his Country exposed to Fire and Sword, he would doubtless put in Practice against any Prince, who shou'd be guilty of the same Transgression towards him; and not suffer that Crime to go unpunish'd in another against himself, for which he had so severely smarted, when he had been guilty of it towards another Emperor.

It is in vain to say in Answer to this, That considering the present Weakness of the Emperor, the present Confusion reigning in the Empire, and how little Regard most Princes pay to verbal Right, when they have actual Strength, no Prince of the Empire would be deterred by these Apprehensions, from letting his Troops march where-ever he thought it proper for his Interest: Such Arguments will pass upon no body, as no body can imagine, but unless these Considerations had had their Weight, the Army now

in *Flanders* would certainly have been in the Heart of the Empire.

For tho' I might allow, what has been so clamorously resounded thro' this Island, that the Payment of these Troops was the first Object in our Ministers Thoughts; yet I cannot imagine they would have so far neglected the Utility of them, (if it had been only to gild the Pretence, and soften the Odium of paying them) as not to have sent them, if they could have march'd thither, where they might have assisted the Queen of *Hungary*, and distress'd *France*, rather than to a Place where they could do neither; and where they only borrow'd the Sanction of her *Hungarian* Majesty's Name, without being of the least Use to her Cause. Nor can the Ministers dispute the Impossibility of these Troops being of any Use in *Flanders*; because if they could have been of any, why were they not? And that they have been of none, is evident to all Mankind.

Another

Another plain Proof that the Princes of the Empire are not so little apprehensive of incurring the Ban of the Empire, and acting against the fundamental Laws of the Empire, as some of our ignorant or hypocritical Politicians describe them, appears from the late Conduct of the Kings of *Prussia* and *Poland*: For why should the King of *Prussia* refuse, for all *Silesia*, to act offensively this last Year for the Queen of *Hungary*, when the Year before he offer'd to do it for half *Silesia*, if it were not because the present Emperor was only Elector of *Bavaria*, when the King of *Prussia* would have acted against him; and that after he became Emperor, the Terrors of the Ban of the Empire made both him and the King of *Poland* resolve not to enter (as they could not do it with Safety) into any Treaties or Engagements that should carry them one single Step beyond a Neutrality.

And what one Prince of the Empire has dared to let one single Man,

either as an Ally, an Auxiliary, or a Mercenary, march or engage for the Queen of *Hungary* against the Emperor? And what could have left her *Hungarian* Majesty so destitute of a single Assistant throughout all the Empire, but every Prince of the Empire knowing the Risk he would run, if he dared to act in her Defence, since her Enemy became Emperor; and that the Princes of the Empire in that Situation would not be treated like common Enemies in War, but be look'd upon as Rebels?

Consider too the Absurdity those three great Kings of *England*, *Prussia*, and *Poland* (who are likewise Electors) must have been guilty of in giving their Votes to make that Man Emperor, whom in the same Moment they were forming Alliances to make War upon; and by these Means contriving and contributing to make themselves Rebels: And what Solution could be found for their seeming Perjury at that Election, when at the
same

same time that they swore they thought him the properest Man to be the Guardian of the Empire, they shew'd by their Actions they thought him the properest Man to be treated as an Enemy.

There are some political Casuists, and Treaty Sophists, who ashamed to deny the palpable Truth of the Fears every German Prince has of incurring the Ban of the Empire, pretend to distinguish the present Case of acting for the Queen of *Hungary* from all other Cases of acting against the Emperor; by saying, that as this War commenced when he was only Elector of *Bavaria*, it is to be consider'd not as a War between the Queen of *Hungary* and the Emperor, but as a War between two Princes of the Empire. But in Answer to this very weak, frivolous Argument, urged by these impotent Distinguishers, I will only ask them, in case any Englishman had taken up Arms in defence of his legal Sovereign *Edward* the II^d. against his
Wife

Wife and his Son, whether after the Death of *Edward* the III^d if that Englishman continued in Arms against *Edward* the III^d, when he became King, it would not immediately have changed that very Act, originally of Loyalty, into an Act of Rebellion? And what those Men (to bring an Instance of a later Date) who had taken up Arms for King *James* against the Prince of *Orange* were deem'd, when they continued in Arms against King *William*?

Another Argument made use of, more feeble and trifling yet, if possible, than the former, by these expert Distinguishers, in order to show that the assisting the Queen of *Hungary* against the Emperor, is no Infringement of the 8th Article of the Treaty of *Westphalia*, is this; That the Diet of the Empire in the Reign of the late Emperor *Charles* the VIth did ratify and guaranty the *Pragmatic Sanction* in favour of the Queen of *Hungary's* Succession; and therefore the taking
up

up Arms in defence of the Queen of Hungary and the *Pragmatic Sanction*, tho' against the Person of the Emperor, is no Infraction of the Treaty of *Westphalia*, because it is only in Maintenance of a Law of the Empire against the Emperor : Whereas if these close Arguers had given themselves the Trouble to consider the *eighth Article of the Treaty of Westphalia*, they would find that this Article is made expressly to provide against this very Case being decided by Arms, as it permits mutual Alliances and Guarantees to the Princes of the Empire, for the Defence and Preservation of their Rights, Dominions, and Possessions, with an explicit Proviso, that those mutual Alliances and Guarantees shall not empower them to act by Force against the Emperor or the Empire, or in any Manner to violate or infringe their Oath of Fidelity to the Emperor and the Empire, any more than to the Breach of the public Peace, or against the general Tenor of that Treaty.

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This Article of the Treaty of *Westphalia* is repeated almost word for word in the sixth Article of the Capitulation of the last Emperor *Charles* the VIth. And as the Capitulations of the Emperors at their Elections are prepar'd and model'd by the Electors, it is evident that the Electors do not dispute this inherent Right in the Emperor, as it is specifically thus admitted in an Act made to secure their own Rights. And tho' in the Capitulations of the Emperors *Leopold* and *Joseph*, as well as in this of the Emperor *Charles* the VIth, there are new Restrictions put on the Emperor with regard to the Forms he is to observe in putting any Prince under the Ban of the Empire, (the Proceedings against the Electors of *Cologne* and *Bavaria* not having been carried on in a manner which the Princes of the Empire thought consistent with their Rights and Dignities) yet those new Restrictions are meerly with regard to the Forms, and without the least Dispute or Cavil on the Point
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of any Prince of the Empire engaging in a War against the Emperor being sufficient Cause for his incurring this severe Penalty.

The Proceedings of *Charles* the Vth against the Confederates of *Smalcald*, as well as the Proceedings of *Ferdinand* the IIId, against the Elector Palatine *Frederic* on the Affair of *Bohemia*, plainly show too that the Princes of the Empire bearing Arms against the Emperor, is contrary to the fundamental Laws and Constitutions of the Empire; since the two Cases I have quoted were both antecedent to the Treaty of *Westphalia*; and show that the Treaty of *Westphalia* in this Point, was no innovating Introduction of a new Right given to the Emperor, but explanatory only of a former inherent Right. And as the Treaty of *Westphalia* was a Treaty (as I have just observed) made in Favour of the Rights of the Princes of the Empire, and to secure their Privileges against Prerogatives pretended to by the Emperor;

so if this Prerogative of the Emperor, That no Prince of the Empire should, on any Pretence whatsoever, make War against him, had not been deem'd essential to the Dignity of the Emperor, and the Peace of the Empire, and a fundamental Law not to be departed from, it would never have been so explicitly and specifically renew'd at that *Æra*, and in that Treaty.

There is another Circumstance which shows that any Prince of the Empire assisting the Queen of *Hungary* upon this Occasion, would be guilty not only of an Infraction of the Treaty of *Westphalia* with regard to the Person of the Emperor, but even with regard to the Empire: For as the Legislative Power of the Empire has granted the Imperial pecuniary Aid of the fifty Roman Months to the Emperor, towards the Support of this War, the Empire has by this Act so far adopted his Cause, as to make it virtually an Imperial War, since legally supported by Imperial Tributes: And of course

course so far rescinded the Act formerly made in favour of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, as to cut up that Argument at least by the Roots, of the Princes of the Empire supporting the Queen of *Hungary* being deem'd the Support of the Laws of the Empire against the Emperor; since the Legislative Power of the Empire can never look upon that War to be a Violation of the Laws of the Empire, which it has granted an imperial Aid to carry on: Nor could those Princes of the Empire who voted for the present Emperor ever possibly call this War, on his Part, a Violation of the Laws of the Empire; since it was an Act in which he was engaged at the Time of his Election, and consequently at a Time when those Princes, who voted for him, solemnly swore they gave him their Voices, as the properest Guardian of those very Laws, which they must now say he was overturning; and consequently must own, that they either voluntarily,

or by Intimidation, took an Oath which they knew to be false.

Before I quit this Head, I must observe what lasting Benefits have ever accrued to those Princes, who on these Occasions have stuck to the Emperor, (and particularly in the Cases I have quoted) and of what lasting Detriment it has been to those Families who have born Arms against him. In the XVIth Century, *John Frederic* Elector of *Saxony*, and *Philip* Landgrave of *Hesse*, were both, on Account of the League of *Smalcald*, not only put under the Ban of the Empire by *Charles* the Vth, but the last imprison'd, and not releas'd till after the Peace of *Pasfau*; and the first, after being disposs'd of his Electorate (which was given to *Maurice* Duke of *Saxony*) was even condemned to die, tho' that Sentence was afterwards chang'd into Imprisonment too.

On Account of the Troubles in *Bohemia*, every body knows that the Losses of the Elector *Palatine*, who
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was engag'd against the Emperor, and the Gain of the Elector of *Bavaria*, as well as of the Elector of *Saxony*, who had both assisted the Emperor, were so essential and permanent, that the Elector of *Bavaria* was on that account rais'd to the Electoral Dignity; that the Elector of *Saxony* had *Lusatia* given him for his Reward; and that the Elector *Palatine*, tho' by the Treaty of *Westphalia* restor'd to the rest of his Dominions, was for ever, in consequence of this Conduct, deprived of the *Upper Palatinate*, which the House of *Bavaria* possesses at this Day. And had the Losses of the Elector *Palatine* been only temporary, had his Restoration on the *Westphalian Treaty* been total, like that of the Elector of *Bavaria* by the Treaty of *Baden*; yet I fancy what these Princes and their Countries suffer'd in the Interim, would be sufficient to deter any other Prince of the Empire from being very forward in exposing himself, or his Possessions, to the same Fate; or very flippant in provoking

voking a Power that has shown on so many Occasions, it has the Means in its Hands not only of inflicting such smarting and immediate Chastisement, but of punishing the Sins of the Fathers upon the Children, and making the remotest Generations of those Offenders bear the hereditary Scars of its Resentment.

When therefore the Advocates for taking the *Hanoverians* into our Pay, labour to show they are not useless to us by being under an Incapacity of marching into the Empire, and say they will be responsible for the *Hanoverians* accompanying the *English*, where-ever the *English* shall be order'd to march; the Fallacy of this way of arguing is so obvious, that there are few Heads, I believe, weak enough to imagine such Stuff will deceive, and fewer still weak enough to be deceiv'd by it: The Answer to this way of reasoning being as manifest as the Fallacy of it; since I as firmly believe that the *Hanoverians* will
march

march where-ever the *English* are order'd, as I believe the Orders of the *English* will be calculated not to interfere with this Incapacity the *Hanoverians* lye under of marching into the Empire.

Besides, the short Answer to all the flimsy, sophistical Reasons given to prove that these Troops dared, could, or would march into the Empire, is this: If they could, why did they not? And is there a Man in *England*, or in *Europe*, believes they ever will?

There is another Circumstance relating to the *Hessian* Troops, which is a farther Proof, if farther Proof was wanting, that he at least who lets out those Mercenaries, takes it for granted, no Troops hir'd of a Prince of the Empire can act against the Emperor; since if he had been of another Opinion, he would hardly have sent 6000 *Hessians* to assist the Emperor, and let out 6000 more to *England*, to cut the Throats of their Sons, Brothers, and Fathers, by fighting against him.

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There is another Particular concerning these *Hessians*, which I cannot help here mentioning, only to show by the by, how beneficially for this Country the public Money is laid out; what notable Services are perform'd by those we hire with it; and what sharp, able Bargains our Ministers make with those who traffick with us on these Occasions.

When the Queen of *Hungary* was at War with the King of *Prussia* and the Emperor, and with no other Power as Principals, we in order to assist her took 6000 *Hessians* into our Pay; and when they were in our Pay, what Assistance she was like to have from them, I should be glad to learn; when the Prince, of whom they were hir'd, told us (as is currently reported at least) in plain Terms, If we wanted to make use of them against the Emperor, they cou'd not march; and against the King of *Prussia* they shou'd not march: whilst *England*, with unexampled Patience, took these Declarations

rations for no Affront, and with excellent Oeconomy paid these Troops for their *no Service*.

But that no such Misfortune and Disgrace will ever happen to us with regard to the *Hanover* Troops, I firmly believe; since I dare say the King of *England* will never require any thing of them so disagreeable to the Elector of *Hanover*, as to produce any Refusal to obey him, or even any grumbling at their Task.

But if these Troops *must* have nothing to do in the Empire, *can* have nothing to do in *Flanders*, and (notwithstanding all the extravagant Schemes, and absurd Proposals we have heard of) *will* have nothing, I hope, to do in *France*; what is it we pay them for? And with what View, and to what Purpose is this Army in *Flanders* assembled?

From what has been already said, it is evident it is not to serve the Queen of *Hungary*, because in *Flanders* she has no Service for them; it is not to

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distress *France*, because it tends to drawing the War to a Place, which *France* wishes for a Pretence to make the Scene of Action; it is not to oblige the *Dutch*, for they not only refuse to join us, but are apprehensive of the Consequences of this Step for the same Reason, that *France* may hope to make some Advantage of it. Having therefore shown what Purposes this Army can *not* serve, I should be extremely glad to hear what Purposes they *can*.

But before I proceed to examine the Hints that have been thrown out of the Advantages that have arisen, or may arise from this Measure, I must take notice, that as far as one may depend on private Intelligence, authenticated in some measure by the Notoriety of a few public Facts, it is not unreasonable to suspect, that this Army in *France* has not only been of no Use to the Queen of *Hungary*, but has even prevented some Steps being taken, which would for the present have suspend-

suspended the Troubles in *Germany*, and in all probability have procured a Peace there; several Overtures having been made to the Queen of *Hungary*, besides that at the Siege of *Prague*, not at all improper for the Basis of future Negotiation, which it has been said she has constantly rejected, principally, if not solely, at our Instigation. Our Ministers knowing, that if a Peace had been made last Summer, or even a Suspension of Arms agreed to, there would have been no Pretence for our assembling an Army in *Flanders*; if we had no Army in *Flanders*, no Pretence for taking the *Hanoverians* into our Pay; and if the *Hanoverians* were not taken into our Pay, no Pretence for the Ministers to make their Court, by asking the Parliament to give the King above Half a Million to play at right Hand and left with himself, in the double Capacity of *King* and *Electors*: A Scheme so prejudicial to the true Interest of the King, whilst it seems to flatter a false one,

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that

that it makes the Ministers equally culpable to the King and the People, by delusively betraying the Interest of the first, and more apparently sacrificing that of the last.

It will be natural enough for those who have a mind to dispute this Chain of reasoning, and vindicate our Ministers from what, I hope, are only the malicious and groundless Suggestions of their Enemies, to ask how it was possible for the Ministers, tho' they might have had a mind to have acted in this way, to have prevailed with the Queen of *Hungary*, for the sake of their own Projects, to reject any Proposals of Accommodation that were advantageous to herself; and if they were not advantageous, why we should impute their Dissuasion to any other Motive?

In answer to which I shall say, what most People believe, tho' I hope without good Foundation, which is, that our Ministers fed her with Hopes they never design'd to gratify; and told her, if she would reject all Proposals for Peace, they would get her by Force

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an Equivalent for *Silesia*; promising that this Equivalent should be either the Dutchy of *Lorraine*, or the Kingdom of *Naples*, according as future Contingencies, Events, and Circumstances, should make the one or the other most practicable.

Allured by these Promises, inoculated on the natural hereditary Inflexibility of *Austrian* Pride, she rejected all Offers of Accommodation with the Emperor, and depended on her Expectations being answered by those who had raised them.

It was in this View still to flatter and amuse her, that the Enemies of the present Administration have suggested, that the Court of *Vienna* was told, the bold Stroke would soon be struck, of *Commodore Martin's* appearing in the Bay of *Naples*, whilst a Squadron of our Ships should be sent into the *Adriatic* to transport the *Austrian* Troops, that at the same time were to make a Descent on the Northern Side of *Italy*, on the Kingdom of *Naples*; and which, if I am not misin-

misinform'd, were actually order'd to march to *Trieste* for that Purpose.

But to the Queen of *Hungary's* great Disappointment, these Troops were not transported; nor did *Commodore Martin's* Appearance before *Naples* produce any thing, but the Confirmation of a Neutrality which had been agreed to before; and in consequence of which his *Neapolitan* Majesty's Troops had already receiv'd Orders to separate from those of *Spain*; that is, as far as they are now separated; which is nothing more than the King of *Naples* recalling as many of those Troops as are necessary for the Defence of his own Dominions, and leaving as many (and those the Flower of his Army) for the Assistance of *Spain*, as he can spare; upon the Pretence of those Troops, which are left, not being under his Command or Direction, as they had only been formerly lent him by the Court of *Spain*, and were now in the *Spanish* Pay.

The Queen of *Hungary's Neapolitan*
Hopes

Hopes being thus defeated, the *Successaneum* (it is rumour'd) upon this Disappointment was the giving her new Hopes, in order to produce a new Deception, that since the Design on *Naples*, from the Impracticability, was forc'd to be laid aside, the Design upon *Lorrain* should be pursued. To adjust this Undertaking, and plan the Execution of this Scheme, it has been generally thought, the Duke of *Aremberg* was sent over to *England*; and that during his Residence and Negotiations here, Assurances were given by our Ministers, that the Troops in *Flanders* (late as it was in the Year) should march in conjunction with the *Austrians* on this Expedition, our Ministers knowing all the while it was impossible; but still carrying on the Farce by sending public Orders for the Troops to march, with private Instructions at the same time to our Officers there, to make such Remonstrances against it, as should justify this second Breach of Promise at the Court

Court of *Vienna*. The public Orders for marching the Duke of *Aremberg* (it is said) insisted upon carrying over in his own Pocket, not caring to take our Minister's Word for sending them any other Way: But on his Arrival in *Flanders*, he found these Orders being sent was no Security for their being obey'd, and perceived our Ministers, notwithstanding their Professions and his Caution, had still found Means to falsify the one, and elude the other.

Whether this Artifice was really put in Practice, whether it was seen thro' by the Court of *Vienna*, and how kindly our Conduct on this Occasion was taken there, Time and future Transactions will discover; as well as what Foundation there has been for these general Opinions I have related, that have been entertained of all our private Negotiations this last Year with the Court of *Vienna*; which every Body is more apt to credit, from not knowing how otherwise to account for the very odd Conduct of the Court
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of *Vienna*, in its more open and public Transactions.

Let us now examine the Hints thrown out by the Administration to reconcile Peoples Minds to this Army in *Flanders*; for as no body has ventur'd to say or write one Word directly in Vindication of the Measure, we can only consider what has been urg'd to draw collateral Approbation, by Inferences and Consequences. The general Boasts of the Administration on this Occasion are, the marvellous good Effects the Vigour of the *English* Counsels have had in *Europe*; and by that Vigour they would by Implication have you always understand they mean the Army in *Flanders*, for otherwise these Boasts are nothing to the Purpose.

When the Ministers come to particularize on these good Effects of our Vigour, these are, I think, the Articles on which they principally expatiate, and lay their greatest Strefs: ---

The Accommodation between the Queen of *Hungary* and the King of
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Prussia.----- Her *Hungarian* Majesty's *Magnanimity*. ---- The *Firmness* of the King of *Sardinia* ----- The *Stop* put to the ambitious Designs of *Spain* in *Italy*. ---- The Change of Affairs in the *North*, with *Sweden's* public Requisition of our good Offices towards making Peace with *Russia*. ---- The excellent good Disposition of the *States General*;---and the defensive Alliance lately concluded between the Courts of *London* and *Berlin*.

As to the Accommodation between the Queen of *Hungary* and the King of *Prussia*, the present Ministers, if they promised her privately no future Equivalent for the Cession of *Silesia* publicly made, evidently made a much worse Bargain for her, than the late Ministry had offer'd her the Year before ; and if they did promise her any Equivalent, they not only have no Merit to plead, but deserve the highest Censure, as in that Case they gave a Promise which they must sacrifice the Interest of *England*, if they

they endeavoured to perform, and the Honour and Faith of *England*, if they did not. But let this Transaction be good or bad, it is very manifest from the Date of it, that our Army in *Flanders* could have had no Influence in it whatever.

And as to her *Hungarian* Majesty's Magnanimity, if our Ministers mean by that Magnanimity her Rejection of all Offers of Accommodation last Summer with the Emperor, and that this Magnanimity was owing to our public Vigour, or our private Encouragement; I think we have little Reason to brag of being the Cause of that Magnanimity, or she to rejoice at the Effect of it: For if such magnanimous Conduct was the Consequence of our having an Army in *Flanders*, it is so far from being an advantageous one for us, or for her, that it shows our Forces there have been as prejudicial to her Counsels as useless to her Arms.

As I have shown that our Army in *Flanders* could have nothing to do

with the Accommodation between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Berlin*, from the Date of that Accommodation; so the same Skill in Chronology, and a little in Geography, will suffice to demonstrate that the Assistance of the King of *Sardinia* was full as independent of any Advantages that could be propos'd by him from those Forces. In the first place, as an Army in *Flanders* could from its Distance be of no more Use to his *Sardinian* Majesty, than *Kouli-Kan's* Army in *Persia*; and in the next, that this Treaty with the Queen of *Hungary* being sign'd the first of *February* last, N. S. was concluded about seven or eight Months before our Army was assembled in the *Netherlands*: So that all the Merit our present Ministers have to boast of, upon this Acquisition of his *Sardinian* Majesty's Force thrown into the Queen of *Hungary's* Scale (if it is an Acquisition) is their having had such powerful Arts of Persuasion; as to prevail with him to take 200,000 *l.* of our Money, *ex post facto*,
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for a Treaty which he had consented to without that Article during the late Administration. But when our Ministers talk of the Firmness of his *Sardinian* Majesty, I should be glad to know whether they mean with regard to his *Faith*, his *Resolution*, or his *Strength*; since his *Firmness* in one of these three Articles, some late Transactions but too plainly demonstrate must have been a little shaken; and as it is not quite so manifest in which of the Three it remains unshaken, I should be glad to be inform'd: as well as what Use his *Firmness* would be of in one of the Three without the other Two.

As to the *Stop* put to the ambitious Designs of *Spain* in *Italy*, if there were any *Stop* it could not be owing to the Army in *Flanders*. But so far from a *Stop* being put to these Designs, they seem to every body, but our Ministers, to have succeeded hitherto but too well; for considering the Rigor of the Season, the little Assistance given by *France*, the Difficulty of sending Recruits, and the
supposed

Supposed Poverty of the Court of *Spain*, the Progress made by the *Spanish* Arms in that Part of the World, where they are actually in Possession of the Dutchy of *Savoy*, and *Chamberry* its Capital, is almost as surprizing as that the *English* Ministers, notwithstanding the Notoriety of these Facts, should brag in this Situation of their Progress being stopp'd.

The Neutrality of his *Neapolitan* Majesty, I think the Ministers do not pretend was owing to the Army in *Flanders*, but impute it to our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*; tho' they might with the same Truth, if not with the same Plausibility, have imputed it (as has been already proved) to the one full as justly as to the other. The Marquis *de Castro Pignano*, the *Neapolitan* General, having not only received, but actually executed the Orders for the Separation of his Troops from those of *Spain*, a Week before *Commodore Martin* was in Sight of *Naples*.

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I cannot quit this Article without making one Observation, to show the little Reason our Ministers have to plume themselves upon this *Cromwellian* Step (as it is call'd) of *Commodore Martin's* Transaction at *Naples*; and my Observation is this: it either was in the Power of the *British* Fleet to terrify his *Neapolitan* Majesty, and force him to comply with our Demands, or it was not. If it was not, what have we to brag of? And if it was, how came our Ministers to make so ill a Use of that Power, as not to take this Occasion to play *Maillebois's* Policy upon the Queen of *Spain*, and tell her, if she would not do *England* Justice by coming to a proper Conclusion of the *Spanish* War, that tho' we could not hurt her in *Spain*, we wou'd shake the Crown upon the Head of this favourite Son, and attack her in a Place where she was not only weakest, but forest.

The happy Turn of Affairs in the *North* is what falls next under Consideration;

deration ; but in what Point this happy Turn appears, I am as much at a loss to discern, as I should be to perceive its Connection with our Army in *Flanders*, if any such Turn did really exist. *Russia's* assisting the Queen of *Hungary* is no Part of this happy Turn, since I do not hear of a *Russian* ordered to march in her Favour. This happy Turn then is confin'd to the single Circumstance of *Sweden's* public Requisition of our good Offices towards a Peace with *Russia* ; that is, *Sweden* by *French* Eloquence and *French* Money had been instigated to enter into a War with *Russia*, which *French* Remittances no longer enabled her to carry on with Advantage ; and as *Sweden* could not propose to *Russia* to make the Instigators of the War the Mediators for Peace, she apply'd to *England* to act in that Capacity. But no great Honour, nor any great Advantage that I can perceive results from this to *England*. Yet supposing it an Incident replete with both, I return
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to my former Question; In what Manner could these superlative Honours and wonderful Advantages be imputed to the Influence of our Army in *Flanders*?

As to the present excellent good Disposition of the *States General*, what our Ministers may know of their private Disposition I cannot pretend to say; but if we may judge of their private Disposition by their public Declarations, and of their Thoughts by their Actions, their present Disposition seems to me to be in every Article so like their former Disposition, that I see no Alteration our Army in *Flanders* has produced in *Holland*, but bringing them publickly to disavow our Measures; whereas formerly they only privately refused to join in them: And supposing even the Three Proposals consented to by Seventeen Towns out of the Nineteen should be carry'd, it would be very far from answering those Reports given out by our Ministers, of the *Dutch* being at last come
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into our Measures; since it would amount to nothing more, than the *Dutch* going to lock up the Doors of some Houses, which the Carelessness of their Neighbours had left open, and which it was for their Interest and Security should be kept shut, to prevent those Houses being rifled by their Enemies, or inhabited by any body but their Friends.

The Defensive Alliance lately concluded between *England* and *Prussia*, I can as little impute to our Army in *Flanders*, as any other of those Events above-mention'd; or if I could impute it to our Army in *Flanders*, I must still be at a loss, whether I ought to call it a good or a bad Effect of that Measure, as I know not on what Conditions that Alliance is form'd: But if, as it is suspected and rumour'd, any Article of that Alliance, or any consequential Declaration of his *Prussian* Majesty, does prohibit the Entrance of our Army in *Flanders* into the Empire, or acting against the combined Forces

Forces of *France* and the *Emperor*, I must look upon that Alliance so far from being a good Effect of our assembling an Army in *Flanders*, that I can see it in no other Light than tying up our Hands where we have something to do, and leaving them at liberty only where we have nothing to do but to pay: Nor can it sure be very unnatural for the World to imagine, since the Ministers have been so forward to brag of this Alliance, and so backward to give the least Hint of any one of the Terms of it, that the Articles of this Treaty are not greatly to their Honour, or our Advantage. The Title indeed of a defensive Alliance between *England* and the King of *Prussia*, shows it can be no very great Advantage to *England*. For what Defence does *England* want? Or what has the King of *Prussia* to defend us? He has no Fleet that ever I heard of; if he had, is our own so fallen that it is not sufficient even for our Defence? And as to Land Forces, it is very plain we want none of those

for our Defence, by the Number we have sent out of the Kingdom. That this Treaty therefore neither is, nor can be very beneficial to *England*, I think, unseen as it is, from the Nature of things, is very evident, as well as that it may chance hereafter to draw us into many Scrapes. For if we engaged ourselves when this Treaty was made (that is, before the Death of the the Elector *Palatine*) to defend the King of *Prussia*'s Pretensions to the then eventual Succession of *Juliers* and *Bergue* against the Guarantee of *France* to the House of *Sultzbach*, or to guarantee his new Acquisition of *Silesia*, we may have the Pleasure and Benefit, from one of these Stipulations, of being not only deeper engaged in a War with *France*, but from the other may happen, after spending some Millions to support the Queen of *Hungary*, to squander a few more to pull her down, if ever she should think of resuming *Silesia*; and since we love Land-Wars so well, may

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into the Bargain have the Recreation of a little Fighting, or at least a Pretence for some subsidiary Treaties, and taking twenty or thirty Thousand foreign Troops into our Pay.

England therefore cannot, as I can conceive, be otherwise concern'd in this advantageous Treaty between the Courts of *Berlin* and *London*, than having its Strength, its Wealth, its Interest and its Safety eventually staked, for the Preservation and Security of the foreign Possessions of both Parties to this Alliance.

Nor can I imagine this Alliance tends much more to the Support of the House of *Austria* than the Welfare of *Great Britain*; as common Sense must demonstrate to all the World, that the same Policy which induced the King of *Prussia* to take advantage of the Weakness of the House of *Austria*, to possess himself of so delicious a Morfel as *Silesia*, will hinder him from ever contributing so far to restore the Strength of the House
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of *Austria*, as to enable that House to resume, on its recover'd Strength and Prosperity, what he took from it in its Decline and Adversity. Nor will the envious and jealous Eyes with which the other Princes of the Empire have generally look'd on the House of *Austria*, as well as the Hardships and Injustices they have suffered from that House, induce them, I believe, to be very active and officious in procuring the Resurrection of a Power, whose Decay seem'd so much to gratify their Pride, and whose Ruin seem'd to give them no other Concern than who should get the first and largest Share of its Spoils. If therefore this miraculous Resurrection of the House of *Austria* to its former Strength, Grandeur and Dominion, was a feasible Operation, it would be one that must not only be effected by *England* alone, without the Assistance of any other Power, but as much against the Inclination of almost every Prince of the Empire,

Empire, as against the Inclination of *France* itself.

From what I have said, it is easy to perceive how little Merit the present Administration have, in all the things they boast of as Merits; and if they were Merits, how little they would be owing to our Army in *Flanders*; since they are all either Merits that arose previous to that Measure, or Merits in which that Measure could have no Sort of Share, or Merits which exist only in their own Boastings; so that with Regard to a Retrospect, they have endeavour'd to reap where they have not sow'd; and with Regard to the future, I fear where they have sown, they will not reap.

It cannot surely then be thought unfair to conclude, from these Premises, that since the Ministers have not given one single Reason to justify the Original Principle of this Measure, that they have not any Reason to give, or, what is worse, none that will bear the Light.

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If it should then be ask'd, Why, with one War upon our hands, we will draw ourselves into another; the only Answer the Ministers can make must be, Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why will you make yourselves Principals in a War in which you ought only to be Auxiliaries? Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why do you run yourselves into Expences you can't bear, into Difficulties you will find it so hard, if not impossible to get out of, into Inconveniences you see no End of, Pursuits where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles in which you have so much to lose? Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why, if the Queen of *Hungary* is to be farther assisted, do you instead of sending her Money, which might assist her, expend treble the Money she would be thankful for, in raising Forces that can't assist her? Because
we

we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why did you dissuade the Queen of *Hungary* from listning to all Offers of Accommodation the last Summer, and particularly at the Siege of *Prague*? Why did you endeavour to prevent her accepting the Terms proposed of reciprocal Evacuations of *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, leaving other Claims and Pretensions to future Negotiations and civil Decision; which is the End they must come to, unless these Squabbles last for ever? Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why did you embark in this Measure, without the Junction, Consent, Approbation, or even Participation of *Holland*? Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

Why have you alone taken upon you the Hazards, Burdens and Expences of a Scheme, which all the Powers of *Europe* combined would not perhaps be able to execute, and which no Power in *Europe* will assist

K

you

you in? Because we are determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*.

And if any impertinent Body shou'd ask, Why are you so determin'd to have an Army in *Flanders*? As there is but one Answer to that Question, and very few People so ignorant, after what has past this Winter, as not to know that One, I shall decline giving an Answer, which almost every Reader will give himself, and which I heartily wish could not be justly given by any body.

But thus much I will say, That if our taking 16000 *Hanoverians* into the *British* Pay was a necessary Consequence, if not the Cause of our assembling an Army in *Flanders*; considering the Turn this Step has taken, and might easily have been foreseen would take in this Country, I am free to declare, that worse Advice, in my Opinion, for the Interest of the present Family on the Throne, could not have been given to the King, than having any Army in *Flanders* at all. And I am
so

so strongly of this Opinion, that if the
 assembling an Army in *Flanders* had
 been as necessary a Part of our general
 System of foreign Politics, as it was
 unnecessary; if it were as much in o-
 ther Points to our Advantage, as it is to
 our Prejudice; and that our present
 System of foreign Politics was as right
 as it is wrong; yet rather than occasi-
 on all the ill Blood this Step of paying
Hanoverians with *English* Money has
 produced in this Island; rather than
 sow the Seeds of such Jealousies as this
 Advice has awaken'd in the King's best
 Subjects; and rather than lay the Foun-
 dation of such Discontents and Murmu-
 rings, as the Universality of the People
 have expressed on this dangerous, if
 not fatal Incident, this most pernici-
 ous, if not wicked Counsel; I would,
 for the sake of the Interest of this Fami-
 ly in this Country, have let the House
 of *Austria* take its Chance for any Fate
 in *Germany*, rather than have risk'd the
 smallest Grain of the Affections of the
 K 2 People

People to the House of *Hanover* in *England*.

But that which makes this Advice more palpably and notoriously bad (I had almost said criminal) is, that it was conducive to no one good End whatever; and that instead of submitting to this Inconvenience for the sake of other Advantages, a hundred other Inconveniences were to be submitted to for the sake of pursuing this favourite Point of the Ministers, and this Detestation of every other Man in the Kingdom.

Nor can there indeed be a stronger Condemnation of these Proceedings of the present Ministers, than That only Argument made use of by their most sanguine Apologists and warmest Advocates, which is, That since the Measure is taken (tho' they have not one word to say in its Defence) it must be supported. An Argument which, if once allow'd to operate and prevail, must abet on all Occasions every extravagant and ruinous Project of every
future

future Minister in this Country : And if a more injudicious and more pernicious Project than this can ever be conceiv'd and enter'd into by any future Administration, this way of reasoning must make the Parliament accessory to their Guilt, share the Odium in the Nation, and bring the Parliament to be an Instrument in the Execution of such Measures, instead of a Check upon the Advisers; a Sanction for their Guilt, instead of the Terror of it; and an Asylum where these Criminals will find Protection, instead of a Tribunal where they ought to find Punishment.

But if this way of reasoning upon this Occasion should so far influence the Parliament, as to induce them seemingly to approve and promote the Measures, which every Individual must condemn and desire to have no longer pursued; a seeming Justification of the Ministers so obtain'd from the Parliament, would be so far from alleviating their Fault, that it ought to be imputed to them as an additional
 Crime

Crime, that they brought the Parliament into this Dilemma: And if the Ministers pretend to construe this Lenity in the Parliament, as an Encouragement to proceed in their present System, and do not take the Hint of the Parliament designing nothing more than giving them an Opportunity to make their own Retreat, instead of so far disgracing the Executive Part of the Government to all *Europe*, as by the Legislative Part of it to force them into a Retreat; if the Ministers, I say, should be so infatuated, as to put this Construction on the Proceedings of Parliament, and pretend to mistake the Sense of all the Members who compose that Body, they will only show how little they deserve this Lenity; and consequently prove to the Parliament, and all Mankind, how useless it wou'd be to Them, and how dangerous to the Nation, for the Parliament to proceed with the same Mildness a second time.

But

But that which adds still to the Blame and Censure the Ministers deserve for advising this Measure of taking the *Hanoverians* into *English* Pay, and which is (if possible) yet more blameable and censurable than even the Measure itself, is the Manner in which they advised the Crown to take this Step: For as the King declared from the Throne, at the Beginning of this Session, that the Design of taking these Troops into our Pay was already formed before the Close of the last Session; Why, on so important a Point as this, was not the Sense of Parliament taken? And is it not plain, that the Ministers must, on this Occasion, have declined taking the Advice of Parliament, when they had an Opportunity of doing it, for one of these Reasons? Either that they chose the Crown should act by their Advice, rather than the Advice of Parliament; and that they prefer'd the taking of this Step by an unnecessary, as well as an improper Exertion of the Prerogative,

tive, to the other constitutional Method; or that being determin'd to take this Step, at the Time they were conscious it would not be warranted by Parliament, if laid before the Parliament, they chose to act against what they knew to be the Sense of Parliament, as well as if it had been declared; and trust to bringing the Parliament subsequently into supporting a Measure, which they knew they could not bring it previously into approving: Depending on the Prevalence of this new-broach'd Doctrine, of the Parliament being obliged to enable the Crown to go on with any Measure already enter'd into, let the Measure itself be ever so improper; and tho' the entering into it at all (if the Sense of Parliament had been taken upon it) was what the Ministers knew the Parliament would infallibly have declar'd against; and proved they knew to be the Case, because they could have no other Reason for not bringing the Parliament to some Declaration upon it.

But if this Doctrine is to prevail, and this Method of the Crown acting by the Advice of Ministers preferably to the Advice of Parliament is to grow into a Custom, there is an End of the Institution of Parliaments in that Capacity of the great Council of the Nation; the Capacity in which not only their own Dignity is most concern'd, but that on which the Security of this Country entirely depends. For if Parliaments are not to be consulted before Measures are taken, and that they must be oblig'd, after they are taken, to support what they do not approve, the Parliament of *England* will be like the Parliament of *Paris*, no longer the Advisers, but the Registers only of Regal Acts; neither allow'd to dissuade the entering into mad Projects, to stop them in their Progress, or hinder the Execution of them, let them be ever so ruinous; and what is still worse, must incur all the Odium with the People, by making the People pay for the Execution of those ve-

ry Schemes, which have no other Tendency than draining their Purses, ruining their Trade, undermining their Liberties, and bringing this Country, as well as this Constitution, to Destruction. For if Parliaments are to be deprived of a deliberative Voice whilst a Measure is concerting, and obliged, whether they approve or disapprove, to support it, when it is begun to be executed; and requir'd to give, not only the seeming Assistance of their Countenance, but the real Assistance of Money to defray the Expences of it; the Two Houses of Parliament, if ever this Doctrine prevails, and this Practice in future Times grows into a Custom, will be nothing more than the *Empfoms* and *Dudleys* of the Crown, to squeeze and impoverish the People under the Appearance of Legality, and within the Letter of the Law, in order to feed such Avarice and Rapaciousness, as we read of in the Reign of *Henry* the VIIth, or such

such Profusion and Extravagance as we find in the Annals of his Son.

In short, as I think there is no Species of Objection to which this Measure of assembling an Army in *Flanders* is not liable, considering all the Circumstances of *Europe* at this Time in general, and our own Circumstances in particular, I shall, in as short a manner as I can, recapitulate what I have endeavour'd to inculcate, and flatter myself I have demonstrated in this Paper.

That this Measure of assembling an Army in *Flanders* is bad, as originally founded on erroneous Principles of Policy.

That the Manner in which it has been executed is worse, as tending to destroy the Rights of Parliament.

And that the Consequences to be apprehended from it, with regard to Dangers abroad, and our Divisions at home, are worst of all.

That the Restoration of the House of *Austria* to its former Strength, the

End the Ministers affect to propose, is impracticable.

That if it were practicable, our aiming at it alone without the Co-operation of *Holland*, is contrary to the *Sense* of the Nation, contrary to the *Sense* of Parliament, and contrary to the common *Sense* of all Mankind.

That the Dangers to which we expose ourselves, and the Expences we are at in the Manner we proceed, are more than this End proposed would be worth, even if it were attainable.

That this Measure, even on this Plan of supporting the Queen of *Hungary*; is no Support to her, as an Army in *Flanders* can do her no good.

That in *Germany*, where she wants Assistance, and where Assistance in all probability would be efficacious, as the Troops we have taken into our Pay are under an Incapacity of going into the Empire, so as to act against the Emperor, we have made it impossible for us to assist her.

That

That we have therefore paid Troops at a monstrous Expence for a Service they cannot perform.

That we are making ourselves by this Measure Principals in a War, where we ought only to be Auxiliaries; and in such a manner, that we cease to be an Auxiliary to any other Power, and shall be in a Situation to have no other Power an Auxiliary to us.

That the War with *Spain* being more than we know how to carry on, or terminate to Advantage, the entering into another is Madness.

That the neglecting a necessary maritime War, and inviting an unnecessary Land War, is unpardonable.

That this Army in *Flanders* is no Assistance to the Queen of *Hungary*, whom we pretend designing to succour; no Prejudice to *France*, whom we pretend designing to distress; nor agreeable to *Holland*, whom we pretend designing to oblige.

That from this Measure it is much to be fear'd things may take such a
Turn,

Turn, that *France* will have no Enemy but *England*, *England* no Ally; and at War with Two Powers, the weakest of which alone is experimentally, at present, shown to be more than *England* knows how to deal with.

That this Measure is therefore contrary to common Prudence, considering our present Circumstances.

That it is contrary to permanent general Rules of Policy, considering us as an *Island*.

That it is contrary to our Interest, consider'd as a *maritime* Power.

That it is contrary to our Interest, consider'd as a *trading* Nation.

That it is contrary to our Interest, consider'd as an *indebted* Nation.

That the Manner in which it has been proceeded upon, is *unconstitutional*.

And what is worst of all, That some Parts of this Measure are so contrary to the Interest of the present Family on the Throne, that if the Measure had been as right, as it was wrong, in every

every other Part, it ought from that Consideration alone to have been laid aside.

And yet if that should happen to be the Case, which is but too generally suspected, and has been often suggested, that the very thing which ought to have been a Reason for not entering into this Measure, was the Motive for setting it on foot ; that it was not a bad Consequence flowing from it, but the corrupted Source that fed it ; and not a Branch of this Project, but the Root of it ; what must Ministers capable of concerting such Schemes, and giving such Advice, deserve from the King, the Parliament, and the People, for abusing the Confidence of the First, striking at the most valuable and salutary Privilege of the Second, and sacrificing the Interest of the Last ?

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